The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality
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The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality. / Hendon, Ebbe; Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen; Sloth, Birgitte.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1996, p. 274-282.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - The one-shot deviation principle for sequential rationality
AU - Hendon, Ebbe
AU - Whitta-Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen
AU - Sloth, Birgitte
N1 - JEL Classification: C72
PY - 1996
Y1 - 1996
N2 - We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for extensive form games. A weak consistency condition is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well known One-Stage-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium
AB - We present a decentralization result which is useful for practical and theoretical work with sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and related equilibrium concepts for extensive form games. A weak consistency condition is sufficient to obtain an analogy to the well known One-Stage-Deviation Principle for subgame perfect equilibrium
U2 - 10.1006/game.1996.0018
DO - 10.1006/game.1996.0018
M3 - Journal article
VL - 12
SP - 274
EP - 282
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 3046327