Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Perpetrator Abhorrence : Disgust as a Stop Sign. / Munch-Jurisic, Ditte Marie.

In: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 45, No. 2, 04.2014, p. 270-287.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Munch-Jurisic, DM 2014, 'Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign', Metaphilosophy, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 270-287. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12082

APA

Munch-Jurisic, D. M. (2014). Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign. Metaphilosophy, 45(2), 270-287. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12082

Vancouver

Munch-Jurisic DM. Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign. Metaphilosophy. 2014 Apr;45(2):270-287. https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12082

Author

Munch-Jurisic, Ditte Marie. / Perpetrator Abhorrence : Disgust as a Stop Sign. In: Metaphilosophy. 2014 ; Vol. 45, No. 2. pp. 270-287.

Bibtex

@article{a4eb01ad9b4049869c38ffe240a51ca7,
title = "Perpetrator Abhorrence: Disgust as a Stop Sign",
abstract = "Most contemporary research on disgust can be divided into “disgust advocates” and “disgust skeptics.” The so-called advocates argue that disgust can have a positive influence on our moral judgment; skeptics warn that it can mislead us toward prejudice and discrimination. This article compares this disagreement to a structurally similar debate in the field of genocide studies concerning the phe- nomenon of “perpetrator abhorrence.” While some soldiers report having felt strong disgust in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocity, scholars dis- agree on whether such disgust is moral in nature. These empirical cases provide us with reasons to reconsider the normative features of disgust. Inspired by the conceptualization of disgust in Immanuel Kant and Aurel Kolnai, and as an alternative to both the disgust advocates and the skeptics, this article argues that the analogy of a stop sign can better help us define disgust responses.",
author = "Munch-Jurisic, {Ditte Marie}",
year = "2014",
month = apr,
doi = "10.1111/meta.12082",
language = "English",
volume = "45",
pages = "270--287",
journal = "Metaphilosophy",
issn = "0026-1068",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Perpetrator Abhorrence

T2 - Disgust as a Stop Sign

AU - Munch-Jurisic, Ditte Marie

PY - 2014/4

Y1 - 2014/4

N2 - Most contemporary research on disgust can be divided into “disgust advocates” and “disgust skeptics.” The so-called advocates argue that disgust can have a positive influence on our moral judgment; skeptics warn that it can mislead us toward prejudice and discrimination. This article compares this disagreement to a structurally similar debate in the field of genocide studies concerning the phe- nomenon of “perpetrator abhorrence.” While some soldiers report having felt strong disgust in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocity, scholars dis- agree on whether such disgust is moral in nature. These empirical cases provide us with reasons to reconsider the normative features of disgust. Inspired by the conceptualization of disgust in Immanuel Kant and Aurel Kolnai, and as an alternative to both the disgust advocates and the skeptics, this article argues that the analogy of a stop sign can better help us define disgust responses.

AB - Most contemporary research on disgust can be divided into “disgust advocates” and “disgust skeptics.” The so-called advocates argue that disgust can have a positive influence on our moral judgment; skeptics warn that it can mislead us toward prejudice and discrimination. This article compares this disagreement to a structurally similar debate in the field of genocide studies concerning the phe- nomenon of “perpetrator abhorrence.” While some soldiers report having felt strong disgust in the moment of committing or witnessing atrocity, scholars dis- agree on whether such disgust is moral in nature. These empirical cases provide us with reasons to reconsider the normative features of disgust. Inspired by the conceptualization of disgust in Immanuel Kant and Aurel Kolnai, and as an alternative to both the disgust advocates and the skeptics, this article argues that the analogy of a stop sign can better help us define disgust responses.

U2 - 10.1111/meta.12082

DO - 10.1111/meta.12082

M3 - Journal article

VL - 45

SP - 270

EP - 287

JO - Metaphilosophy

JF - Metaphilosophy

SN - 0026-1068

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 106270999