Individuality, collectivity and the intersubjective constitution of intentionality

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This paper argues that first-person singular I- and first-person plural we-intentionality are constituted in normative second-person relations. Their relata are individuals who mutually recognize each other as loci of responsibility. Such relations constitute an I–You, which is argued to be sufficient for both singular I- and plural we-intentionality. Whenever there is I-intentio-nality there is we-intentionality, because whenever the relevant second-person relations ob-tain, conditions sufficient for both are satisfied. Consequently, the possibility of autonomous individual I-intentionality as well as plurally shared we-intentionality depends on at least two individuals involved in normative mutual recognition. Neither individual is an intentional ‘I’ independently of entering the I–You, and when they do so they are an intentional ‘we.’
Original languageEnglish
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)1-22
Number of pages22
Publication statusPublished - 2020
Externally publishedYes

    Research areas

  • Faculty of Humanities - Intentionality, individuality, intersubjectivity, normativity, collectivity, autonomy, authority, inferentialism

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