Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearch

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Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy. / Zahavi, Dan.

In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. S1, 2023, p. 66-77.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearch

Harvard

Zahavi, D 2023, 'Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy', The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. S1, pp. 66-77. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12534

APA

Zahavi, D. (2023). Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 61(S1), 66-77. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12534

Vancouver

Zahavi D. Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy. The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2023;61(S1):66-77. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12534

Author

Zahavi, Dan. / Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy. 2023 ; Vol. 61, No. S1. pp. 66-77.

Bibtex

@article{d7e4895803b643b99a86adeb1d9b87db,
title = "Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy",
abstract = "One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self-reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self andthe group, between individual subjectivity and social life.The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.",
author = "Dan Zahavi",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1111/sjp.12534",
language = "English",
volume = "61",
pages = "66--77",
journal = "Southern Journal of Philosophy",
issn = "0038-4283",
publisher = "JohnWiley & Sons, Inc.",
number = "S1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy

AU - Zahavi, Dan

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self-reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self andthe group, between individual subjectivity and social life.The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.

AB - One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self-reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self andthe group, between individual subjectivity and social life.The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.

U2 - 10.1111/sjp.12534

DO - 10.1111/sjp.12534

M3 - Journal article

VL - 61

SP - 66

EP - 77

JO - Southern Journal of Philosophy

JF - Southern Journal of Philosophy

SN - 0038-4283

IS - S1

ER -

ID: 369990453