Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy
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Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy. / Zahavi, Dan.
In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. S1, 2023, p. 66-77.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Group-identification, collectivism, and perspectival autonomy
AU - Zahavi, Dan
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self-reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self andthe group, between individual subjectivity and social life.The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.
AB - One of the aims of the 40th Annual Spindel Conference was to discuss whether the ongoing, but relatively distinct, investigations of relational autonomy and collective intentionality could crossfertilize. Whereas the concept of relational autonomy was developed to do justice to the relational character of selfhood, and as an alternative to traditional conceptions of autonomy, which were accused of exaggerating the self-reliance and social independence of the self, recent discussions of collective intentionality have often centered on the question of whether and how collective intentions differ from aggregations of individual intentions. As different as they might otherwise be, theoretical explorations of autonomy and collective intentionality intersect at a crucial point: both require an understanding of the relationship between the self andthe group, between individual subjectivity and social life.The aim of the following paper is to argue that the collective intentionality literature contains insights that cannot merely contribute to our understanding of autonomy, but also prevent us from taking our relationism too far.
U2 - 10.1111/sjp.12534
DO - 10.1111/sjp.12534
M3 - Journal article
VL - 61
SP - 66
EP - 77
JO - Southern Journal of Philosophy
JF - Southern Journal of Philosophy
SN - 0038-4283
IS - S1
ER -
ID: 369990453