Despite an increased focus on scientific practice in the philosophy of science in recent years, there has been relatively little focus on malpractices such as intentional fraud or gross negligence. This is the more striking since malpractice in research  both in the form of outright misconduct such as fraud and deceit and in the form of the so-called ‘grey zone’ behavior such as sloppiness and incompetence  has been a topic of growing concern both among scientists themselves and among politicians, administrators and in the general population (for an overview of this development, see e.g. Steneck 1999; 1994).
Most existing philosophical analyses of malpractice in science have centered on intentional deceit and treated the phenomenon primarily as a topic for ethical analyses. However, in this paper I shall go beyond this focus on deceit and discuss intentional, reckless as well as negligent actions, and I shall argue that an analysis of these actions goes beyond research ethics and includes important epistemological aspects as well. Hence, one of the aims of this paper is to point to a new area for philosophy of science in practice to address.
I shall start with the notion of epistemic dependence and the necessity for scientists to be able to trust their collaborators and their peers, and reiterate core contributions to the literature on the epistemic and moral components of trustworthiness and how trustworthiness is assessed. Based on this background, I shall examine situations in which scientists have not been trustworthy, and I shall discuss how the assessment of trustworthiness compares to the assessment of untrustworthiness.