Alternative health insurance schemes: a welfare comparison
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
In this paper, we present a simple model of health insurance with asymmetric information, where we compare two alternative ways of organizing the insurance market. Either as a competitive insurance market, where some risks remain uninsured, or as a compulsory scheme, where however, the level of reimbursement of loss is to be determined by majority decision. In a simple welfare comparison, the compulsory scheme may in certain environments yield a solution which is inferior to that obtained in the market. We further consider the situation where the compulsory scheme may be supplemented by voluntary competitive insurance; this situation turns out to be at least as good as either of the alternatives
Original language | English |
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Journal | Journal of Health Economics |
Volume | 21 |
Issue number | 5 |
Pages (from-to) | 739-756 |
ISSN | 0167-6296 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2002 |
ID: 130664