Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics

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Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics. / Kasperbauer, Tyler Joshua.

In: Environmental Ethics, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2015, p. 221-237.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Kasperbauer, TJ 2015, 'Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics', Environmental Ethics, vol. 37, no. 2, pp. 221-237. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics201537219

APA

Kasperbauer, T. J. (2015). Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics. Environmental Ethics, 37(2), 221-237. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics201537219

Vancouver

Kasperbauer TJ. Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics. Environmental Ethics. 2015;37(2):221-237. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics201537219

Author

Kasperbauer, Tyler Joshua. / Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics. In: Environmental Ethics. 2015 ; Vol. 37, No. 2. pp. 221-237.

Bibtex

@article{cc9d8bbca3c34cd1aa90873cd7296055,
title = "Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics",
abstract = "Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols have argued that within metaethics, sentimentalism is the theory that best accords with empirical facts about human moral psychology. Recent findings in experimental moral psychology, they argue, indicate that emotions are psychologically central to our moral concepts. One way of testing the empirical adequacy of sentimentalism is by looking at research on environmental values. A classic problem in environmental ethics is providing an account of the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities, which is often thought to be inconsistent with sentimentalism. However, no supporters of sentimentalist accounts of environmental values have evaluated the empirical adequacy of their claims. The relevant evidence falls under two broad categories: (1) responses to nature itself and (2) moral evaluations of environmental behaviors. The evidence indicates that both valuing and disvaluing nature are ultimately grounded in emotions.",
author = "Kasperbauer, {Tyler Joshua}",
year = "2015",
doi = "10.5840/enviroethics201537219",
language = "English",
volume = "37",
pages = "221--237",
journal = "Environmental Ethics",
issn = "0163-4275",
publisher = "Environmental Philosophy, Inc.",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Naturalizing sentimentalism for environmental ethics

AU - Kasperbauer, Tyler Joshua

PY - 2015

Y1 - 2015

N2 - Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols have argued that within metaethics, sentimentalism is the theory that best accords with empirical facts about human moral psychology. Recent findings in experimental moral psychology, they argue, indicate that emotions are psychologically central to our moral concepts. One way of testing the empirical adequacy of sentimentalism is by looking at research on environmental values. A classic problem in environmental ethics is providing an account of the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities, which is often thought to be inconsistent with sentimentalism. However, no supporters of sentimentalist accounts of environmental values have evaluated the empirical adequacy of their claims. The relevant evidence falls under two broad categories: (1) responses to nature itself and (2) moral evaluations of environmental behaviors. The evidence indicates that both valuing and disvaluing nature are ultimately grounded in emotions.

AB - Jesse Prinz and Shaun Nichols have argued that within metaethics, sentimentalism is the theory that best accords with empirical facts about human moral psychology. Recent findings in experimental moral psychology, they argue, indicate that emotions are psychologically central to our moral concepts. One way of testing the empirical adequacy of sentimentalism is by looking at research on environmental values. A classic problem in environmental ethics is providing an account of the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities, which is often thought to be inconsistent with sentimentalism. However, no supporters of sentimentalist accounts of environmental values have evaluated the empirical adequacy of their claims. The relevant evidence falls under two broad categories: (1) responses to nature itself and (2) moral evaluations of environmental behaviors. The evidence indicates that both valuing and disvaluing nature are ultimately grounded in emotions.

U2 - 10.5840/enviroethics201537219

DO - 10.5840/enviroethics201537219

M3 - Journal article

VL - 37

SP - 221

EP - 237

JO - Environmental Ethics

JF - Environmental Ethics

SN - 0163-4275

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 146173558