Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
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Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. / Morton, Rebecca B.; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 72, No. 2, 2011, p. 485-509.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
AU - Morton, Rebecca B.
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
N1 - JEL classification: D71, D72, D81, D82
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria - swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.
AB - We examine abstention when voters in standing committees are asymmetrically informed and there are multiple pure-strategy equilibria - swing voter's curse (SVC) equilibria where voters with low-quality information abstain and equilibria when all participants vote their information. When the asymmetry in information quality is large, we find that voting groups largely coordinate on the SVC equilibrium which is also Pareto optimal. However, we find that when the asymmetry in information quality is not large and the Pareto optimal equilibrium is for all to participate, significant numbers of voters with low-quality information abstain. Furthermore, we find that information asymmetry induces voters with low-quality information to coordinate on a non-equilibrium outcome. This suggests that coordination on "letting the experts" decide is a likely voting norm that sometimes validates SVC equilibrium predictions but other times does not.
KW - Information aggregation
KW - Voting
KW - Asymmetric information
KW - Swing voter's curse
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2010.09.007
M3 - Journal article
VL - 72
SP - 485
EP - 509
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
SN - 0899-8256
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 33515115