Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
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Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue. / Breinbjerg, Jesper; Platz, Trine Tornøe; Østerdal, Lars Peter.
In: Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 336, 2024, p. 1551–1572.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue
AU - Breinbjerg, Jesper
AU - Platz, Trine Tornøe
AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023, The Author(s).
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.
AB - We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.
KW - FCFS
KW - LCFS-PR
KW - Nash equilibrium
KW - Queueing
KW - Strategic arrivals
U2 - 10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9
DO - 10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85159306538
VL - 336
SP - 1551
EP - 1572
JO - Annals of Operations Research
JF - Annals of Operations Research
SN - 0254-5330
ER -
ID: 356958036