Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue. / Breinbjerg, Jesper; Platz, Trine Tornøe; Østerdal, Lars Peter.

In: Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 336, 2024, p. 1551–1572.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Breinbjerg, J, Platz, TT & Østerdal, LP 2024, 'Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue', Annals of Operations Research, vol. 336, pp. 1551–1572. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9

APA

Breinbjerg, J., Platz, T. T., & Østerdal, L. P. (2024). Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue. Annals of Operations Research, 336, 1551–1572. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9

Vancouver

Breinbjerg J, Platz TT, Østerdal LP. Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue. Annals of Operations Research. 2024;336:1551–1572. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9

Author

Breinbjerg, Jesper ; Platz, Trine Tornøe ; Østerdal, Lars Peter. / Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue. In: Annals of Operations Research. 2024 ; Vol. 336. pp. 1551–1572.

Bibtex

@article{e55afa513573452ea9ec430d1aadc28c,
title = "Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue",
abstract = "We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.",
keywords = "FCFS, LCFS-PR, Nash equilibrium, Queueing, Strategic arrivals",
author = "Jesper Breinbjerg and Platz, {Trine Torn{\o}e} and {\O}sterdal, {Lars Peter}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2023, The Author(s).",
year = "2024",
doi = "10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9",
language = "English",
volume = "336",
pages = "1551–1572",
journal = "Annals of Operations Research",
issn = "0254-5330",
publisher = "Springer",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Equilibrium arrivals to a last-come first-served preemptive-resume queue

AU - Breinbjerg, Jesper

AU - Platz, Trine Tornøe

AU - Østerdal, Lars Peter

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2023, The Author(s).

PY - 2024

Y1 - 2024

N2 - We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.

AB - We consider a queueing system which opens at a given point in time and serves a finite number of users according to the last-come first-served discipline with preemptive-resume (LCFS-PR). Each user must decide individually when to join the queue. We allow for general classes of user preferences and service time distributions and show existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that no continuous asymmetric equilibrium exists, if the population consists of only two users, or if arrival strategies satisfy a mild regularity condition. For an illustrative example, we implement a numerical procedure for computing the symmetric equilibrium strategy based on our constructive existence proof for the symmetric equilibrium. We then compare its social efficiency to that obtained if users are instead served on a first-come first-served (FCFS) basis.

KW - FCFS

KW - LCFS-PR

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - Queueing

KW - Strategic arrivals

U2 - 10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9

DO - 10.1007/s10479-023-05348-9

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85159306538

VL - 336

SP - 1551

EP - 1572

JO - Annals of Operations Research

JF - Annals of Operations Research

SN - 0254-5330

ER -

ID: 356958036