Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
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Compromises and Rewards : stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching. / Gudmundsson, Jens.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2019, p. 365-392.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Compromises and Rewards
T2 - stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
AU - Gudmundsson, Jens
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance. We then derive complementary negative results that show that increasing differences essentially is a necessary condition for the properties to be compatible.
AB - Can we reconcile stability with non-manipulability in two-sided matching problems by selecting lotteries over matchings? We parameterize, through sets of utility functions, how ordinal preferences induce preferences over lotteries and develop corresponding notions of ex-ante stability and non-manipulability. For most sets, the properties are incompatible. However, for the set of utility functions with increasing differences, stability and non-manipulability characterize Compromises and Rewards. This novel rule is fundamentally different from the one that has attracted most attention in the literature, Deferred Acceptance. We then derive complementary negative results that show that increasing differences essentially is a necessary condition for the properties to be compatible.
KW - Compromises
KW - Lottery
KW - Non-manipulability
KW - Rewards
KW - Stability
KW - Two-sided matching
U2 - 10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1
DO - 10.1007/s00182-018-0622-1
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85046809563
VL - 48
SP - 365
EP - 392
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
SN - 0020-7276
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 241093830