Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence
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Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities : experimental evidence. / Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Markussen, Thomas; Meraglia, Simone.
I: Social Choice and Welfare, Bind 58, 27.10.2021, s. 619–677.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities
T2 - experimental evidence
AU - Cobo-Reyes, Ramón
AU - Katz, Gabriel
AU - Markussen, Thomas
AU - Meraglia, Simone
N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2021, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2021/10/27
Y1 - 2021/10/27
N2 - We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.
AB - We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning system (formal or informal) to be implemented in their group. We compare this environment to one in which subjects are allowed to (i) vote on the sanctioning system and (ii) move between groups. We find that the possibility of moving between groups leads to a larger proportion of subjects voting for formal sanctions. This result is mainly driven by subjects in groups with relatively high initial levels of contribution to the public good, who are more likely to vote for informal sanctions when groups are closed than when they are open.
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6
DO - 10.1007/s00355-021-01363-6
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:85118130967
VL - 58
SP - 619
EP - 677
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
SN - 0176-1714
ER -
ID: 285316424