Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents
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Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents. / Fosgerau, Mogens; Lindsey, Robin.
I: Regional Science and Urban Economics, Bind 43, Nr. 5, 2013, s. 764-782.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Trip-timing decisions with traffic incidents
AU - Fosgerau, Mogens
AU - Lindsey, Robin
PY - 2013
Y1 - 2013
N2 - This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.
AB - This paper analyzes traffic bottleneck congestion when drivers randomly cause incidents that temporarily block the bottleneck. Drivers have general scheduling preferences for time spent at home and at work. They independently choose morning departure times from home to maximize expected utility without knowing whether an incident has occurred. The resulting departure time pattern may be compressed or dispersed according to whether or not the bottleneck is fully utilized throughout the departure period on days without incidents. For both the user equilibrium (UE) and the social optimum (SO) the departure pattern changes from compressed to dispersed when the probability of an incident becomes sufficiently high. The SO can be decentralized with a time-varying toll, but drivers are likely to be strictly worse off than in the UE unless they benefit from the toll revenues in some way. A numerical example is presented for illustration. Finally, the model is extended to encompass minor incidents in which the bottleneck retains some capacity during an incident.
KW - Bottleneck model
KW - Congestion
KW - Departure-time decisions
KW - Evening commute
KW - Morning commute
KW - Scheduling utility
KW - Traffic incidents
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84881493518&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002
DO - 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2013.07.002
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:84881493518
VL - 43
SP - 764
EP - 782
JO - Regional Science and Urban Economics
JF - Regional Science and Urban Economics
SN - 0166-0462
IS - 5
ER -
ID: 181871580