Public goods and voting on formal sanction schemes
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support the provision of public goods has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable of either resolving or exacerbating the free-rider problem, depending on parameter settings. Most groups quickly learned to choose parameters inducing efficient outcomes. We find that cooperative orientation, political attitude, gender and intelligence have a small but sometimes significant influence on voting.
Originalsprog | Engelsk |
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Tidsskrift | Journal of Public Economics |
Vol/bind | 95 |
Udgave nummer | 9-10 |
Sider (fra-til) | 1213–1222 |
ISSN | 0047-2727 |
DOI | |
Status | Udgivet - 2011 |
Bibliografisk note
JEL classification: C91; C92; D71; D72; H41
ID: 36061980