Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution. / Höchtl, Wolfgang; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 2011.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution
AU - Höchtl, Wolfgang
AU - Sausgruber, Rupert
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
N1 - JEL classification: A13, C9, D72
PY - 2011
Y1 - 2011
N2 - Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.
AB - Some people have a concern for a fair distribution of incomes while others do not. Does such a concern matter for majority voting on redistribution? Fairness preferences are relevant for redistribution outcomes only if fair-minded voters are pivotal. Pivotality, in turn, depends on the structure of income classes. We experimentally study voting on redistribution between two income classes and show that the effect of inequality aversion is asymmetric. Inequality aversion is more likely to matter if the “rich” are in majority. With a “poor” majority, we find that redistribution outcomes look as if all voters were exclusively motivated by self-interest.
KW - redistribution
KW - self interest
KW - experiment
KW - median voter
KW - inequality aversion
M3 - Working paper
BT - Inequality Aversion and Voting on Redistribution
PB - Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen
ER -
ID: 33663544