Give and Take in Dictator Games
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Give and Take in Dictator Games. / Cappelen, Alexander W.; Nielsen, Ulrik; Sorensen, Erik; Tungodden, Bertil; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
2012.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Give and Take in Dictator Games
AU - Cappelen, Alexander W.
AU - Nielsen, Ulrik
AU - Sorensen, Erik
AU - Tungodden, Bertil
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
PY - 2012/8/2
Y1 - 2012/8/2
N2 - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogeneous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.
AB - It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogeneous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.
KW - dictator game
KW - choice set
KW - social preferences
KW - experiments
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.2122306
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.2122306
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper
BT - Give and Take in Dictator Games
ER -
ID: 241647569