Formulating European work and employment regulation during the pre-crisis years: Coalition Building and institutional inertia
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Formulating European work and employment regulation during the pre-crisis years : Coalition Building and institutional inertia. / Mailand, Mikkel; Arnholtz, Jens.
I: Journal of European Social Policy, Bind 25, Nr. 2, 2015, s. 194-209.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Formulating European work and employment regulation during the pre-crisis years
T2 - Coalition Building and institutional inertia
AU - Mailand, Mikkel
AU - Arnholtz, Jens
PY - 2015
Y1 - 2015
N2 - This article discusses whether the pre-crisis political right-turn in the European Union (EU) has had an impact on the development of European work and employment regulation. It finds that although pro-regulation actors have been weakened in the year leading up to the crisis, the expected weakening of Social Europe is only seen in a minority of the eight cases of EU-level work and employment regulation analysed. It is argued that two mechanisms can help explain this weaker than expected impact: successful resistance from pro-regulation actors and a certain form of organizational inertia linked to the actor’s search for legitimacy, especially the Commission’s need for a stronger social profile in order to be reappointed. Moreover, it is argued that stable coalitions have only played a role in some of the cases. The coalitions in action seem less stable and active than previous studies indicate.
AB - This article discusses whether the pre-crisis political right-turn in the European Union (EU) has had an impact on the development of European work and employment regulation. It finds that although pro-regulation actors have been weakened in the year leading up to the crisis, the expected weakening of Social Europe is only seen in a minority of the eight cases of EU-level work and employment regulation analysed. It is argued that two mechanisms can help explain this weaker than expected impact: successful resistance from pro-regulation actors and a certain form of organizational inertia linked to the actor’s search for legitimacy, especially the Commission’s need for a stronger social profile in order to be reappointed. Moreover, it is argued that stable coalitions have only played a role in some of the cases. The coalitions in action seem less stable and active than previous studies indicate.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - Social Europe
KW - coalitions
KW - employee involvement
KW - employment policy
KW - posting
U2 - 10.1177/0958928715573482
DO - 10.1177/0958928715573482
M3 - Journal article
VL - 25
SP - 194
EP - 209
JO - Journal of European Social Policy
JF - Journal of European Social Policy
SN - 0958-9287
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 139012890