Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice
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Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice. / Kartal, Melis; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
I: American Economic Review, Bind 112, Nr. 10, 10.2022, s. 3367-3397.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Fake News, Voter Overconfidence, and the Quality of Democratic Choice
AU - Kartal, Melis
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
PY - 2022/10
Y1 - 2022/10
N2 - This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We study extensions that allow for partisan biases, targeted misinformation intended to move public opinion in a specific direction, and correlated news signals (due to media ownership concentration or censure). In our experiment, voters are exposed to correct news or misinformation depending on their cognitive ability. Absent overconfidence, more cognitively able subjects are predicted to vote while less able subjects are predicted to abstain, and information is predicted to aggregate well. We provide evidence that overconfidence induces misinformed subjects to vote excessively, thereby severely undermining information aggregation.
AB - This paper studies, theoretically and experimentally, the effects of overconfidence and fake news on information aggregation and the quality of democratic choice in a common interest setting. We theoretically show that overconfidence exacerbates the adverse effects of widespread misinformation (i.e., fake news). We study extensions that allow for partisan biases, targeted misinformation intended to move public opinion in a specific direction, and correlated news signals (due to media ownership concentration or censure). In our experiment, voters are exposed to correct news or misinformation depending on their cognitive ability. Absent overconfidence, more cognitively able subjects are predicted to vote while less able subjects are predicted to abstain, and information is predicted to aggregate well. We provide evidence that overconfidence induces misinformed subjects to vote excessively, thereby severely undermining information aggregation.
KW - Behavioral Political Economy
KW - Voting
KW - Misinformation
KW - Dunning-Kruger Effect
KW - behavioral political economy
KW - voting
KW - misinformation
KW - Dunning-Krugereffect
KW - D72
KW - D83
KW - D91
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.3637866
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.3637866
M3 - Journal article
VL - 112
SP - 3367
EP - 3397
JO - American Economic Review
JF - American Economic Review
SN - 0002-8282
IS - 10
ER -
ID: 338788898