Fairness is intuitive
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Fairness is intuitive. / Cappelen, Alexander W.; Panton, Ulrik Haagen; Tungodden, Bertil; Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl; Wengström, Erik Roland.
I: Experimental Economics, Bind 19, Nr. 4, 2016, s. 727-740.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Fairness is intuitive
AU - Cappelen, Alexander W.
AU - Panton, Ulrik Haagen
AU - Tungodden, Bertil
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert Karl
AU - Wengström, Erik Roland
PY - 2016
Y1 - 2016
N2 - In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker’s cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait.
AB - In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker’s cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait.
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-015-9463-y
DO - 10.1007/s10683-015-9463-y
M3 - Journal article
VL - 19
SP - 727
EP - 740
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
SN - 1386-4157
IS - 4
ER -
ID: 164332030