Everyone is a winner: Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Standard
Everyone is a winner : Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition. / Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
I: European Journal of Political Economy, Bind 26, Nr. 1, 2010, s. 25-35.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
Harvard
APA
Vancouver
Author
Bibtex
}
RIS
TY - JOUR
T1 - Everyone is a winner
T2 - Promoting cooperation through all-can-win intergroup competition
AU - Reuben, Ernesto
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
N1 - JEL classification: H41, M52, C92
PY - 2010
Y1 - 2010
N2 - We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.
AB - We test if cooperation is promoted by rank-order competition between groups in which all groups can be ranked first, i.e. when everyone can be a winner. This type of rank-order competition has the advantage that it can eliminate the negative externality a group's performance imposes on other groups. However, it has the disadvantage that incentives to outperform others are absent, and therefore it does not eliminate equilibria where all groups cooperate at an equal but low level. We find that all-can-win competition produces a universal increase in cooperation and benefits a majority of individuals if the incentive to compete is sharp.
KW - Faculty of Social Sciences
KW - public goods
KW - experiment
U2 - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.002
DO - 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.10.002
M3 - Journal article
VL - 26
SP - 25
EP - 35
JO - European Journal of Political Economy
JF - European Journal of Political Economy
SN - 0176-2680
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 19394062