Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice. / Markussen, Thomas; Reuben, Ernesto; Tyran, Jean-Robert.
2012.Publikation: Working paper › Forskning
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TY - UNPB
T1 - Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
AU - Markussen, Thomas
AU - Reuben, Ernesto
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
PY - 2012/8/2
Y1 - 2012/8/2
N2 - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
AB - The ability of groups to implement efficiency-enhancing institutions is emerging as a central theme of research in economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma situation. Experimental results show that the competitive scheme fosters cooperation. Competition is popular but the electoral outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost always adopted. If likely losers from competition have veto power, it is often not, and substantial gains in efficiency are foregone.
KW - public goods
KW - competition
KW - tournament
KW - cooperation
KW - voting
U2 - 10.2139/ssrn.2121436
DO - 10.2139/ssrn.2121436
M3 - Working paper
T3 - Univ. of Copenhagen Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper
BT - Competition, Cooperation, and Collective Choice
ER -
ID: 241647627