Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests
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Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests. / Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes.
I: Economic Journal, Bind 125, Nr. 589, 01.12.2015, s. 1952-1963.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Belief Precision and Effort Incentives in Promotion Contests
AU - Miklós-Thal, Jeanine
AU - Ullrich, Hannes
PY - 2015/12/1
Y1 - 2015/12/1
N2 - The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise.
AB - The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84954448200&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/ecoj.12162
DO - 10.1111/ecoj.12162
M3 - Journal article
AN - SCOPUS:84954448200
VL - 125
SP - 1952
EP - 1963
JO - The Economic Journal
JF - The Economic Journal
SN - 0013-0133
IS - 589
ER -
ID: 216919021