Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium
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Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium. / Groes, Ebbe; Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen; Sloth, Birgitte.
I: Economic Theory, Bind 13, Nr. 1, 1999, s. 125-142.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Adaptive Learning in Extensive Form Games and Sequential Equilibrium
AU - Groes, Ebbe
AU - Jacobsen, Hans Jørgen
AU - Sloth, Birgitte
N1 - JEL Classification: C72, D83
PY - 1999
Y1 - 1999
N2 - This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment
AB - This paper studies adaptive learning in extensive form games and provides conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning to be sequential equilibria. Precisely, we present a set of conditions on learning sequences such that an assessment is a sequential equilibrium if and only if there is a learning sequence fulfilling the conditions, which leads to the assessment
U2 - 10.1007/s001990050244
DO - 10.1007/s001990050244
M3 - Journal article
VL - 13
SP - 125
EP - 142
JO - Economic Theory
JF - Economic Theory
SN - 0938-2259
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 153593