Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent
Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent. / Tyran, Jean-Robert; Feld, Lars P.
I: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Bind 108, Nr. 1, 2006, s. 135-156.Publikation: Bidrag til tidsskrift › Tidsskriftartikel › Forskning › fagfællebedømt
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent
AU - Tyran, Jean-Robert
AU - Feld, Lars P.
N1 - JEL Classification: K42
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Law backed by nondeterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., selfimposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so
AB - Law backed by nondeterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., selfimposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x
M3 - Journal article
VL - 108
SP - 135
EP - 156
JO - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
JF - Scandinavian Journal of Economics
SN - 0347-0520
IS - 1
ER -
ID: 314121