Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference : Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania. / Stanescu, Catalin Gabriel.

In: European Energy and Environmental Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 6, 2018, p. 223-235.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Stanescu, CG 2018, 'Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania', European Energy and Environmental Law Review, vol. 27, no. 6, pp. 223-235.

APA

Stanescu, C. G. (2018). Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania. European Energy and Environmental Law Review, 27(6), 223-235.

Vancouver

Stanescu CG. Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania. European Energy and Environmental Law Review. 2018;27(6):223-235.

Author

Stanescu, Catalin Gabriel. / Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference : Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania. In: European Energy and Environmental Law Review. 2018 ; Vol. 27, No. 6. pp. 223-235.

Bibtex

@article{b3d19936e21b4a5dad39ba61f21d2012,
title = "Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference: Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania",
abstract = "The article addresses Contracts for Difference as state aid and price stabilization mechanisms needed to mitigate the risks stemming from the incompatibility of liberalized energy markets and nuclear energy investments. It starts by defining the Contract for Difference mechanism as state aid required to support nuclear investments. It continues by analyzing the issue of state aid in relation to the nuclear sector, with focus on the “market failure” argument as it transpires from both the European Commission’s assessment of the state aid scheme and the decision of the Grand Chamber of The Court of Justice of the European Union. Attention is dedicated to the uses of the same support scheme in two similar nuclear projects in Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) and Cernavoda (Romania). The article concludes that given the systemic differences between the two national energy markets, Contracts for Difference might not be a suitable solution for both of them.",
keywords = "The Faculty of Law, Energy, nuclear energy, state aid, market liberalization, Hinkley Point, Cernavoda, market failure",
author = "Stanescu, {Catalin Gabriel}",
year = "2018",
language = "English",
volume = "27",
pages = "223--235",
journal = "European Energy and Environmental Law Review",
issn = "1879-3886",
publisher = "Kluwer Law International",
number = "6",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Stabilization Mechanisms for Nuclear Investments v. Electricity Market Liberalization: The Case of Contract for Difference

T2 - Lessons from the United Kingdom and Romania

AU - Stanescu, Catalin Gabriel

PY - 2018

Y1 - 2018

N2 - The article addresses Contracts for Difference as state aid and price stabilization mechanisms needed to mitigate the risks stemming from the incompatibility of liberalized energy markets and nuclear energy investments. It starts by defining the Contract for Difference mechanism as state aid required to support nuclear investments. It continues by analyzing the issue of state aid in relation to the nuclear sector, with focus on the “market failure” argument as it transpires from both the European Commission’s assessment of the state aid scheme and the decision of the Grand Chamber of The Court of Justice of the European Union. Attention is dedicated to the uses of the same support scheme in two similar nuclear projects in Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) and Cernavoda (Romania). The article concludes that given the systemic differences between the two national energy markets, Contracts for Difference might not be a suitable solution for both of them.

AB - The article addresses Contracts for Difference as state aid and price stabilization mechanisms needed to mitigate the risks stemming from the incompatibility of liberalized energy markets and nuclear energy investments. It starts by defining the Contract for Difference mechanism as state aid required to support nuclear investments. It continues by analyzing the issue of state aid in relation to the nuclear sector, with focus on the “market failure” argument as it transpires from both the European Commission’s assessment of the state aid scheme and the decision of the Grand Chamber of The Court of Justice of the European Union. Attention is dedicated to the uses of the same support scheme in two similar nuclear projects in Hinkley Point (United Kingdom) and Cernavoda (Romania). The article concludes that given the systemic differences between the two national energy markets, Contracts for Difference might not be a suitable solution for both of them.

KW - The Faculty of Law

KW - Energy

KW - nuclear energy

KW - state aid

KW - market liberalization

KW - Hinkley Point

KW - Cernavoda

KW - market failure

M3 - Journal article

VL - 27

SP - 223

EP - 235

JO - European Energy and Environmental Law Review

JF - European Energy and Environmental Law Review

SN - 1879-3886

IS - 6

ER -

ID: 209382622