¿Por qué los autócratas limitan judicialmente su poder? Un análisis comparado de la existencia de altos tribunales en autocracias
Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
The article studies comparatively the decision of the autocrats to establish or preserve high courts, analysing under which conditions they tolerate judicial institutions able to limit and review their power. Through the statistical analysis of new data on autocracies between 1972 and 2002 and case studies, the article analyses how autocrats are more prone to allow high courts in context where there is a powerful political opposition than in countries where the elite is cohesive. This ensures that these courts legitimize those decisions susceptible to generate dissent and avoid that the opposition capitalize controversial political issues that could threat the regime.
|Journal||Revista de Estudios Politicos|
|Publication status||Published - 2012|
- The Faculty of Law - High courts, Judicial Review, Autocracies, Opposition