¿Por qué los autócratas limitan judicialmente su poder? Un análisis comparado de la existencia de altos tribunales en autocracias

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

The article studies comparatively the decision of the autocrats to establish or preserve high courts, analysing under which conditions they tolerate judicial institutions able to limit and review their power. Through the statistical analysis of new data on autocracies between 1972 and 2002 and case studies, the article analyses how autocrats are more prone to allow high courts in context where there is a powerful political opposition than in countries where the elite is cohesive. This ensures that these courts legitimize those decisions susceptible to generate dissent and avoid that the opposition capitalize controversial political issues that could threat the regime.
Original languageSpanish
JournalRevista de Estudios Politicos
Volume158
ISSN0048-7694
Publication statusPublished - 2012

ID: 156429376