Regulation of aquaculture production

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Standard

Regulation of aquaculture production. / Jensen, Frank; Nielsen, Rasmus; Meilby, Henrik.

In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Vol. 25, 2023, p. 161–204.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Jensen, F, Nielsen, R & Meilby, H 2023, 'Regulation of aquaculture production', Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, vol. 25, pp. 161–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w

APA

Jensen, F., Nielsen, R., & Meilby, H. (2023). Regulation of aquaculture production. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 25, 161–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w

Vancouver

Jensen F, Nielsen R, Meilby H. Regulation of aquaculture production. Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. 2023;25:161–204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w

Author

Jensen, Frank ; Nielsen, Rasmus ; Meilby, Henrik. / Regulation of aquaculture production. In: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. 2023 ; Vol. 25. pp. 161–204.

Bibtex

@article{83f727fdb7cc4a8d96cbb5ec15050514,
title = "Regulation of aquaculture production",
abstract = "In this paper, we investigate the economically optimal regulation of aquaculture production. The time between releasing and harvesting fish (rotation time) from a pond is an important decision variable for an aquaculture producer, and we use rotation time as a regulatory variable. By using a general model as a starting point, we construct a basic model for a private and social optimum assuming an infinite time horizon. The quality of fish is explicitly included in our basic model, and we show that a total tax scheme, collected at the end of each rotation, equal to the total discounted damage costs secures a social optimum. We also discuss the implications of several modeling extensions for our regulatory recommendations, but we require that the extensions can be captured within the general model. Examples of modeling extensions include differences between socially and privately fixed costs and discount rates.",
author = "Frank Jensen and Rasmus Nielsen and Henrik Meilby",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w",
language = "English",
volume = "25",
pages = "161–204",
journal = "Environmental Economics and Policy Studies",
issn = "1432-847X",
publisher = "Springer Japan",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Regulation of aquaculture production

AU - Jensen, Frank

AU - Nielsen, Rasmus

AU - Meilby, Henrik

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - In this paper, we investigate the economically optimal regulation of aquaculture production. The time between releasing and harvesting fish (rotation time) from a pond is an important decision variable for an aquaculture producer, and we use rotation time as a regulatory variable. By using a general model as a starting point, we construct a basic model for a private and social optimum assuming an infinite time horizon. The quality of fish is explicitly included in our basic model, and we show that a total tax scheme, collected at the end of each rotation, equal to the total discounted damage costs secures a social optimum. We also discuss the implications of several modeling extensions for our regulatory recommendations, but we require that the extensions can be captured within the general model. Examples of modeling extensions include differences between socially and privately fixed costs and discount rates.

AB - In this paper, we investigate the economically optimal regulation of aquaculture production. The time between releasing and harvesting fish (rotation time) from a pond is an important decision variable for an aquaculture producer, and we use rotation time as a regulatory variable. By using a general model as a starting point, we construct a basic model for a private and social optimum assuming an infinite time horizon. The quality of fish is explicitly included in our basic model, and we show that a total tax scheme, collected at the end of each rotation, equal to the total discounted damage costs secures a social optimum. We also discuss the implications of several modeling extensions for our regulatory recommendations, but we require that the extensions can be captured within the general model. Examples of modeling extensions include differences between socially and privately fixed costs and discount rates.

U2 - 10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w

DO - 10.1007/s10018-022-00354-w

M3 - Journal article

VL - 25

SP - 161

EP - 204

JO - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

JF - Environmental Economics and Policy Studies

SN - 1432-847X

ER -

ID: 326741353