デカルト的な心の概念をめぐるマクダウェルとメルロ=ポンティ

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Recently a number of authors have appealed to the early works of Merleau-Ponty in a critique of the picture of perception presented by McDowell. This debate has been focused on McDowell’s claim that conceptual capacities are essentially involved in our perceptual experiences. In this paper I wish to draw attention to what I consider an additional potentially fruitful meeting point between the philosophies of Merleau-Ponty and McDowell, namely their critique of a certain Cartesian picture of the mind. My aim is to demonstrate how both authors regard a certain conception of nature rather than some independent epistemological project as the background assumption which gives the Cartesian picture its attraction. Furthermore I want to bring out how they share a general conception of the nature of the problem generated by this background assumption. They both regard the problem as a transcendental problem as opposed to a merely epistemological problem
Original languageJapanese
JournalAnnual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan
Volume28
Pages (from-to)1-10
Number of pages10
Publication statusPublished - 2012

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