The epistemic significance of political disagreement

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Documents

The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant evidence and arguments, and their intellectual capacities and virtues, relative to our own, or (2) the expected probability of our interlocutor being correct, conditional on our disagreeing. While these two factors are typically used interchangeably, I show that they have an inverse correlation in cases of disagreement about politically divisive propositions. This presents us with a puzzle about the epistemic impact of disagreement in these cases. The most significant disagreements on (1) are the least significant disagreements on (2), and vice versa. I show that assessing the epistemic status of an interlocutor by reference to either (1) or (2) has uncomfortable consequences in these cases. I then argue that this puzzle cannot be escaped by claiming that we usually have dispute-independent reason to reject the significance of politically charged disagreement altogether.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume176
Pages (from-to)2187–2202
ISSN0031-8116
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019

Number of downloads are based on statistics from Google Scholar and www.ku.dk


No data available

ID: 195494962