Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider

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I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)371-388
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2009

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