Motor Intentionality and the Case of Schneider

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I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s use of the case of Schneider in his arguments for the existence of non-conconceptual and non-representational motor intentionality contains a problematic methodological ambiguity. Motor intentionality is both to be revealed by its perspicuous preservation and by its contrastive impairment in one and the same case. To resolve the resulting contradiction I suggest we emphasize the second of Merleau-Ponty’s two lines of argument. I argue that this interpretation is the one in best accordance both with Merleau-Ponty’s general methodology and with the empirical case of Schneider as it was described by Gelb and Goldstein.
Translated title of the contributionMotorisk Intentionalitet og Tilfældet Schneider
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Issue number3
Pages (from-to)371-388
Number of pages18
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2009

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