If it's all the same to you: blurred consumer perception and market structure

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

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If it's all the same to you : blurred consumer perception and market structure. / Webb, Edward John Dorrell.

In: Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 50, No. 1, 02.2017, p. 1-25.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review

Harvard

Webb, EJD 2017, 'If it's all the same to you: blurred consumer perception and market structure', Review of Industrial Organization, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9512-5

APA

Webb, E. J. D. (2017). If it's all the same to you: blurred consumer perception and market structure. Review of Industrial Organization, 50(1), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9512-5

Vancouver

Webb EJD. If it's all the same to you: blurred consumer perception and market structure. Review of Industrial Organization. 2017 Feb;50(1):1-25. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9512-5

Author

Webb, Edward John Dorrell. / If it's all the same to you : blurred consumer perception and market structure. In: Review of Industrial Organization. 2017 ; Vol. 50, No. 1. pp. 1-25.

Bibtex

@article{87794bab856d432da7619b742f68d803,
title = "If it's all the same to you: blurred consumer perception and market structure",
abstract = "Consumers with bounded perception treat sufficiently similar goods as homogeneous. The effects of bounded perception on a vertically differentiated duopoly with sequential quality choice are examined. When quality entails fixed costs the market becomes more concentrated. When quality entails marginal costs, the second mover may profitably imitate the product of its rival, and the market is either more or less concentrated depending on how bounded perception is. When firms incur entry costs, neither firm may opt to produce when quality entails marginal costs, whereas at least one firm always produces when quality entails fixed costs.",
keywords = "Faculty of Social Sciences, Perception, Similarity, Bounded rationality, Bertrand competition, Vertical differentiation, Oligopoly",
author = "Webb, {Edward John Dorrell}",
year = "2017",
month = feb,
doi = "10.1007/s11151-016-9512-5",
language = "English",
volume = "50",
pages = "1--25",
journal = "Review of Industrial Organization",
issn = "0889-938X",
publisher = "Springer",
number = "1",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - If it's all the same to you

T2 - blurred consumer perception and market structure

AU - Webb, Edward John Dorrell

PY - 2017/2

Y1 - 2017/2

N2 - Consumers with bounded perception treat sufficiently similar goods as homogeneous. The effects of bounded perception on a vertically differentiated duopoly with sequential quality choice are examined. When quality entails fixed costs the market becomes more concentrated. When quality entails marginal costs, the second mover may profitably imitate the product of its rival, and the market is either more or less concentrated depending on how bounded perception is. When firms incur entry costs, neither firm may opt to produce when quality entails marginal costs, whereas at least one firm always produces when quality entails fixed costs.

AB - Consumers with bounded perception treat sufficiently similar goods as homogeneous. The effects of bounded perception on a vertically differentiated duopoly with sequential quality choice are examined. When quality entails fixed costs the market becomes more concentrated. When quality entails marginal costs, the second mover may profitably imitate the product of its rival, and the market is either more or less concentrated depending on how bounded perception is. When firms incur entry costs, neither firm may opt to produce when quality entails marginal costs, whereas at least one firm always produces when quality entails fixed costs.

KW - Faculty of Social Sciences

KW - Perception

KW - Similarity

KW - Bounded rationality

KW - Bertrand competition

KW - Vertical differentiation

KW - Oligopoly

U2 - 10.1007/s11151-016-9512-5

DO - 10.1007/s11151-016-9512-5

M3 - Journal article

VL - 50

SP - 1

EP - 25

JO - Review of Industrial Organization

JF - Review of Industrial Organization

SN - 0889-938X

IS - 1

ER -

ID: 160056636