Decentralized task coordination

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Standard

Decentralized task coordination. / Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Platz, Trine Tornøe.

In: European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 304, No. 2, 2023, p. 851-864.

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Gudmundsson, J, Hougaard, JL & Platz, TT 2023, 'Decentralized task coordination', European Journal of Operational Research, vol. 304, no. 2, pp. 851-864. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026

APA

Gudmundsson, J., Hougaard, J. L., & Platz, T. T. (2023). Decentralized task coordination. European Journal of Operational Research, 304(2), 851-864. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026

Vancouver

Gudmundsson J, Hougaard JL, Platz TT. Decentralized task coordination. European Journal of Operational Research. 2023;304(2):851-864. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026

Author

Gudmundsson, Jens ; Hougaard, Jens Leth ; Platz, Trine Tornøe. / Decentralized task coordination. In: European Journal of Operational Research. 2023 ; Vol. 304, No. 2. pp. 851-864.

Bibtex

@article{22efa861d0894137bd9a827cee4d1dd4,
title = "Decentralized task coordination",
abstract = "We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.",
keywords = "Bargaining, Consistency, Decentralized mechanisms, Game theory, Implementation",
author = "Jens Gudmundsson and Hougaard, {Jens Leth} and Platz, {Trine Torn{\o}e}",
note = "Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 The Author(s)",
year = "2023",
doi = "10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026",
language = "English",
volume = "304",
pages = "851--864",
journal = "European Journal of Operational Research",
issn = "0377-2217",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Decentralized task coordination

AU - Gudmundsson, Jens

AU - Hougaard, Jens Leth

AU - Platz, Trine Tornøe

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2022 The Author(s)

PY - 2023

Y1 - 2023

N2 - We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

AB - We study decentralized task coordination. Tasks are of varying complexity and agents asymmetric: agents capable of completing high-level tasks may also take on tasks originally contracted by lower-level agents, facilitating system-wide cost reductions. We suggest a family of decentralized two-stage mechanisms, in which agents first announce preferred individual workloads and then bargain over the induced joint cost savings. The second-stage negotiations depend on the first-stage announcements as specified through the mechanism's recognition function. We characterize mechanisms that incentivize cost-effective task allocation and further single out a particular mechanism, which additionally ensures a fair distribution of the system-wide cost savings.

KW - Bargaining

KW - Consistency

KW - Decentralized mechanisms

KW - Game theory

KW - Implementation

U2 - 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026

DO - 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.04.026

M3 - Journal article

AN - SCOPUS:85129694587

VL - 304

SP - 851

EP - 864

JO - European Journal of Operational Research

JF - European Journal of Operational Research

SN - 0377-2217

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 307295770