Co-operation as currency: how active coalitions affect lobbying success

Research output: Contribution to journalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Coalition action is a common lobbying strategy to exert influence over policy,
but is rarely addressed in studies of lobbying success. This article adds to
resource exchange theory, firstly, that active co-operation with others to
gather information, optimize strategies and jointly signal a position should
increase lobbying success similarly to spending economic resources on
lobbying on an issue individually. Secondly, it expects important interactions
between active co-operation and economic resources, because the costs and
benefits of co-operation will be distributed unequally among partners who
invest different levels of resources themselves. Using new survey data on
lobbying on 50 policy issues in five European countries, the article provides
strong support for these expectations: Active co-operation on an issue
increases lobbying success measured as perceived influence. Moreover, it
mediates the effect of individual economic resources on lobbying success.
These findings have important methodological and normative implications
regarding alternatives pathways of lobbying power.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of European Public Policy
ISSN1350-1763
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 2019

ID: 223926164