KUA2, Building: 16-1-25
2300 København S
Primary fields of research
My research is focused on a number of issues in philosophy of action (mind), philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of science.
- Philosophy of action/mind: Agent’s knowledge, intentions, control of action, sense of agency
- Philosophy of psychology/cognitive neuroscience: Relation between common-sense psychology and scientific psychology, individuation of computational mechanisms, perception-action models
- Philosophy of science: Model testing, under-determination problems in cognitive neuroscience, mechanistic explanation.
Selected Publications (for a full list)
Philosophy of action and mind:
- Grünbaum, T. (2013). Seeing what I am doing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 86(2), 295-318.
- Grünbaum, T. (2012). First-Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness. In S. Miguens, & G. Preyer (Eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. (pp. 297-320). Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag.
- Grünbaum, T. (2011). Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action. Philosophical Explorations, 14(2), 153-167.
- Grünbaum, T. (2009). Anscombe and Practical Knowledge of What is Happening. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 78, 41-67.
- Grünbaum, T. (2008). Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure. Philosophia, 36(1), 67-86.
Philosophy of psychology/cognitive neuroscience:
- Grünbaum, T. (forthcoming). The Perception-Action Model: Counting Computational Mechanisms. Mind & Language.
- Grünbaum, T. (2015). The feeling of agency hypothesis: a critique. Synthese, 192(10), 3313-3337.
- Grünbaum, T. (2012). Commonsense psychology, dual visual streams, and the individuation of action. Philosophical Psychology, 25(1), 25-47.
Experimental and theoretical work in cognitive psychology/neuroscience:
- Christensen, M. S. & Grünbaum, T. (in press). Sense of moving: Moving closer to the movement. In T. Grünbaum & M. S. Christensen (Eds.), Sensation of Movement. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Christiansen, J. H., Christensen, J. H., Grünbaum, T., & Kyllingsbæk, S. (2014). A Common Representation of Spatial Features Drives Action and Perception: Grasping and Judging Object Features within Trials. PloS one, 9(5), 1-14. [e94744].
- Overgaard, M., & Grünbaum, T. (2012). Cognitive and non-cognitive conceptions of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(3), 137-137.
- Overgaard, M., & Grünbaum, T. (2011). Consciousness and modality: On the possible preserved visual consciousness in blindsight subjects. Consciousness and Cognition, (20), 1855–1859.
Major Research Grants
- DFF 2016-2020: PI on collaborative research project (DKr. 5,670,757): "Intention, Selection, and Agency" (with Professor of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Søren Kyllingsbæk)
- DFF 2012-2015: Co-PI on collaborative research project (DKr. 6,254,816): “Phenomenal Consciousness and Cognitive Motor Control” (with Associate Professor of Cognitive Neuroscience, Aarhus University, Morten Overgaard (PI)).
- DFF 2010-2014: Co-PI on collaborative research project (DKr. 7,783,200): “Intentional action, attention to objects, and working memory” (with Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Søren Kyllingsbæk (PI)).
Service to profession
- Associate Editor of Philosophical Explorations (2015-)
- Referee for public and private research foundations: European Research Council, The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, The Welcome Foundation
- Ad hoc reviewer: Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Synthese, Philosophical Quarterly, Mind & Language, Philosophical Psychology
- President of Danish Society for Philosophy and Psychology (2009-)
Recently taught courses:
- Confirmation Theory and Hypothesis Testing, Spring 2016: Course Schedule.
- Social Cognition, Fall 2015: Course Schedule.
- Philosophy of Action, Spring 2015: Course Schedule.
- Philosophy of Psychology, Fall 2014: Course Schedule.
- Bevidsthedsfilosofi (Philosophy of Mind), Fall 2016: Course Schedule.